Abstract Australian Realist analytic philosophy is full of claims about truthmakers and truthmaking. In this paper, I seek to show that a number of intuitions about truthmaking are jointly inconsistent, and that some common attempts at resolving the inconsistency are unsatisfying. Finally, I propose an account of truthmaking which resolves the tensions as best as possible. This account has great a nities with both relevant entailment and situation semantics. This note can be seen as an apologetic for relevant entailment for those who are familiar with truthmaking, or as an introduction to truthmaking for those familiar with logic. Either way, it is an attempt to apply modern logical methods and insights to a philosophical problem.
: : : suppose a is F : : : What is needed is something in the world which ensures that a is F, some truth-maker or ontological ground for a's being F. What can this be except the state of a airs of a's being F? (Armstrong 1991, page 190) If entails , what makes true also makes true (at least when and are contingent).
(Jackson forthcoming)
The hallowed path from language to universals has been by way of the correspondence theory of truth: the doctrine that whenever something is true, there must be something in the world which makes it true. I will call this the Truthmaker axiom. The desire to nd an adequate truthmaker for every truth has been one of the sustaining forces behind traditional theories of universals : : : Correspondence theories of truth breed legions of recalcitrant philosophical problems. For this reason I have sometimes tried to stop believing in the Truthmaker axiom. Yet, I have never really succeeded. Without some such axiom, I nd I have no adequate anchor to hold me from drifting onto the shoals of some sort of pragmatism or idealism. And this is altogether uncongenial to me; I am a congenital realist about almost everything, as long as it is compatible with some sort of naturalism or physicalism, loosely construed. (Bigelow 1988 pages 122 and 123) The notion of a truthmaker is a central feature of a number of philosophical programmes. We ought to have a clear understanding of what a truthmaker amounts to, of how they operate, and how they are related to other notions, such as entailment and necessity. There are hints of this in the literature, but as I will show, truthmakers are more problematic than many appear to think.
Dispelling Myths
John Fox gives an elegant account of truthmakers in his paper paper`Truthmaker' (Fox 1987) . In it, he de nes the`truthmaker axiom' as follows By the truthmaker axiom I mean the axiom that for every truth there is a truthmaker; by a truthmaker for A, I mean something whose very existence entails A. (page 189) As it stands, this axiom needs careful reading. There are a number of ways it could be misinterpreted. Firstly, think of a unicorn. Necessarily, if that unicorn exists, then the claim`a unicorn exists' is true. So, a unicorn is something whose existence would necessitate the claim`a unicorn exists.' This doesn't mean that the claim`unicorns exist' is in fact true, because the truthmaker in question, the said unicorn, doesn't itself exist. For a truthmaker to be any good at making things true, it needs to exist. 1 For a second re nement, consider a philosophical view which takes it that all things which exist, exist necessarily | for example, David Lewis' modal realism. For Lewis, existence in the`broad' is simply inhabiting the collection of possible worlds. And as a result, anything that exists in this sense, exists necessarily. However for Lewis actuality is a contingent matter. What is in the world I'm in is a function of the world I'm in. And actuality is clearly the appropriate notion for the truthmaker axiom. On this view, a truthmaker for A is some actual object (some inhabitant of the actual world) such that its actuality necessitates A.
For a nal re nement consider the truth`there have been at least three performances of Arvo P art's Magni cat.' It's hard to see what the truthmaker for this could be other than three performances of P art's Magni cat. Some take there to be a single object which comprises these three performances (and whatever else in the world is needed as the truthmaker for the claim). Of course, whatever the object is, it is hopelessly`gerrymandered' just like the object which has the three smallest pictures on my o ce wall and the rst copy of the Magna Carta as parts. (For example, one performance has taken place in Estonia, one in Berlin, and one in Canberra. Thè object' consisting of these performances is at least a bit strange.) Some take this to be an object in its own right. Others don't. So, in deference to the latter, we allow a truthmaker to be an object or objects.
It is also important to realise what the truthmaker axiom is not. It does not posit a unique truthmaker for every claim. (There are many truthmakers for`someone has swum across the English Channel,' for example.) It does not posit a minimal truthmaker for every claim either. (A minimal truthmaker for a claim is a truthmaker which is a part of every truthmaker for that claim.) Although people often talk of \the truthmaker" for a truth, the truthmaker axiom does not postulate any kind of uniqueness. The one truth can be made true in any of a number of di erent ways. 1 I am being a little too quick here. Given a particular unicorn u, it may not be the case that in every world in which u exists, it is a unicorn. If this is the case, then u, by itself, is not a truthmaker for`there is a unicorn' in any of the worlds in which it exists. However, the point that a truthmaker must exist for it to be any good as a truthmaker remains unscathed.
To sharpen up the truthmaker axiom, we need to take account of entailment. The classical notion of entailment in use ties entailment to necessity. This follows immediately from the de nition. Now, this may not be such a problem. There's something quite touching in the view that every particle in the universe (and everything else besides!) is a witness to all necessary truths. 3 If we read the classical entailment thesis like this: s is a truthmaker for A if and only if were A to fail then s wouldn't exist, then you can at least see why some would think that were 2 + 2 to not equal 4, then at least nothing would be quite the same.
However, polemical point scoring about relevance is not my business here. 4 The problems with the classical entailment thesis are more significant than merely con icting with our intuitions about what counts as a truthmaker for necessary truth. It threatens collapse of the entire notion of truthmakers. To see this, we need another thesis about truthmakers.
The Disjunction Thesis For any truthmaker s, s j= A _ B if and only if s j= A or s j= B.
The disjunction thesis seems quite plausible. I will leave discussing the thesis until later. For now, let's see how the disjunction thesis and the classical entailment thesis interact.
Consequence 5 Every truthmaker makes true every truth.
We assume that every instance claim of the form A _ A is a necessary truth. By one fact we have already seen, every s is a truthmaker for each instance of A_ A. Let A be a truth. So, any s either makes A or A true, by the disjunction hypothesis. Given that A is true, then nothing makes A true. So, s is not a truthmaker for A. So, it must be a truthmaker for A.
The result may be called truthmaker monism. We end up with all truthmakers on a par. All making true every truth. This is clearly not acceptable for any philosophically interesting account of truthmakers.
Jackson and Necessary Truths
Frank Jackson has noticed at least some of the subtleties associated with truthmakers. His approach to truthmakers (as much as we can discern from the throw-away line in his`Armchair Metaphysics') denies the classical entailment thesis. We will restate Jackson's claim as follows: Jackson' And I refer the reader to Anderson and Belnap 1975 , Routley et al. 1982 and Anderson et al. 1992 Unfortunately, Jackson's revision will not do, because of a simple argument. We need only two hypotheses. Firstly, that there is a contingent truth (say C) and that any truthmaker of a conjunction A^B is a truthmaker for both conjuncts A and B. (This is a consequence of the classical entailment thesis, but it is very plausible in its own right.) It is very hard to see how this could fail | if anything makes A^B true, it must surely make A true and make B true as well. Given these two hypotheses, then Jackson's revision still faces problems. Granted even his weaker condition, any truthmaker for a contingent truth is still is a truthmaker for every necessary truth. The argument is as follows. Take C, a contingent truth, and s a truthmaker for C. Take A, a necessary truth. Because C is contingent, so is C^A. It is impossible for C to be true while C^A is false (because, by hypothesis, A cannot be false) so on the classical account of entailment, C entails C^A. So, by Jackson's condition, s j= C^A, and hence s j= A. It follows that my fridge is still a truthmaker for Goldbach's conjecture (or its negation).
The problem is not restricted to the counterintuitive nature of everything being a truthmaker for necessary truths. If we grant the disjunction thesis, then even using Jackson's restricted thesis, any truthmaker for a contingent truth is still a truthmaker for every truth. The argument is as before. Since a truthmaker for any contingent claim is a truthmaker for every instance of A _ A, that truthmaker must support either A or A. Jackson's thesis does not prevent the collapse into truthmaker monism.
3 Disjunction: or \Or and Shmor" It's clear that the disjunction thesis is doing a lot of work. Without it, we simply have counter-intuitive results. With it, we have a dreadful collapse into monism. Granted the disjunction thesis and either the classical entailmetn thesis or Jackson's weakening of the thesis, truthmakers cannot draw any distinctions at all other than that between truth and falsity. Perhaps the problem is with the disjunction thesis, and not with the classical entailment thesis.
Consider how the disjunction thesis could fail. Clearly if s makes A true, or it makes B true, then it will make A _ B true too. So the right-to-left part is trouble free. The scope for dispute is the step from s j= A _ B to s j= A or s j= B. Both parties in the dispute can agree that if s j= A _ B then there must be something which either makes A true or makes B true.
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The Goldbach conjecture states that every even number is the sum of two primes.
The issue is whether s itself must be such a truthmaker. Suppose it is not. Then by its very existence (which entails A _ B) there must be another object, a truthmaker of A or a truthmaker of B. As a result, there is a relation of necessitation between distinct objects. The mere existence of s necessitates the existence of some other object. (You must be careful here, for no particular object does it necessitate the existence of that object.
Rather, it necessitates the existence of some truthmaker, of either A or of B.)
But how can a relation of necessitation of this sort hold between objects?
One way is for s to be an aggregate of objects, each of which must exist for s to exist. However, if one of the parts of s is to be a truthmaker of either A or of B, then s will also be a truthmaker of A or of B (as s will necessitate anything any of its essential parts necessitate). So, this kind of necessary connection is of no help for one who wishes to fault the disjunction thesis. Anyone who wishes to fault it must explain the kinds of necessary connections between objects which grounds a failure of the thesis.
There is another reason to suppose that disjunction satis es the disjunction thesis is that if it doesn't, it would make no di erence if it did. Let me explain. Suppose that disjunction does not satisfy the disjunction property. We can de ne an alternative disjunction (read \shmor") by stipulating that We can also show directly that A ? A must be true. Given that one of A and A is true, one has a truthmaker, and hence, A ? A is true. Since we have shown that A ? A must be true (no matter how the truthmakers decide contingent things), we have assured ourselves that A ? A is necessarily true. Yet, it need not be made true by every truthmaker. Rather, it must be made true by some truthmaker. This is a more straightforward (but obviously less reductionistic) account of the interaction between truthmaking and necessity. The necessary truths are those which must be made true by some truthmaker, no matter how they are`arranged. ' We have seen that the classical entailment thesis collapses distinctions between truthmakers for necessary truths. We have also seen that the disjunction thesis together with the classical entailment thesis results in monism. Given that simple` xes' such as Jackson's do not work to repair the damage, and given that there are independent arguments for the disjunction thesis, we must reject the classical entailment thesis in all its forms as an account of truthmaking.
Truthmakers and Worlds
After reading an earlier draft of this note, Frank Jackson responded with a number of arguments against the disjunction thesis. He conceded that what I have called Jackson's thesis is an unnecessary amendment to the classical entailment thesis. But he resists the collapse into monism by rejecting the disjunction thesis. By examining his arguments for rejecting the disjunction thesis, we will be able to see the issues at stake in maintaining a theory of truthmakers.
Jackson's rst argument goes as follows. Suppose that s j= A for some claim A. Then s j= (A^B) _ (A^ B) for any B we like. But we can choose B in such a way that neither s j= B nor s j= B. In other words, we deny truthmaker monism. But with the disjunction thesis, s j= A^B or s j= A^ B, contradicting our supposition that s 6 j= B and s 6 j= B.
It ought to be clear that this argument is a way of rephrasing our original argument proving monism from the classical entailment thesis and the disjunction thesis. If we hold to distribution (the equivalence of s j= (A^B) _ (A^C) and j= A^(B _ C)) then Jackson's argument relies essentially on the fact that any truthmaker for A is a truthmaker for A^(B_ B). Or equivalently, any truthmaker makes true every instance of B _ B. So, the argument is simply a modus tollens to our modus ponens. We have shown that, given the disjunction thesis, the classical entailment thesis leads to trouble. Jackson's argument shows that, given the classical entailment thesis, the disjunction thesis leads to trouble. This, in itself, is not anything new. What Jackson's argument here gives us is another example of where trouble arises. If we grant the disjunction thesis and the principle of distribution, we must deny that any truthmaker for A is also a truthmaker for A^(B _ B). But that isn't at all a surprise. People have been recommending paring apart A and A^(B _ B) for many years. 6 Jackson's second argument relies on what he calls a`model' of the truthmaker story. For Jackson, we can take a truthmaker for the sentence A to be the set of all worlds in which A is true. Then, s j= A just when A is true in all worlds in s. A truthmaker is`actual' just when the actual world is a member of s. Given this model, the truthmaker for a disjunction A _ B is the union of the truthmakers for the disjuncts. So, our argument from distinct existences does not take root | the truthmaker for A _ B necessitates either the truthmaker for A or the truthmaker for B, since together they make up the truthmaker for A _ B, and one of them (at least) must contain the actual world. The truthmakers are not disjoint objects, and on this picture we have the (somewhat surprising) consequence that a truthmaker for all truths, the singleton set of the actual world, is a part of (a subset of) all actual truthmakers.
This picture certainly provides some kind of counterexample to the disjunction thesis. But is it a satsifying account? There seem to be reasons to think not. Firstly, the truthmakers are ucla propositions. 7 Some, like David Lewis, take propositions to be ucla propositions. In any case it is hard to see what kind of work a ucla proposition is doing in making a proposition true. This`model' of the theory of truthmakers is not signicantly di erent to what I will call the simple model. A problem with both Jackson's model and the simple model is that they both stray too far from the original intentions of the truthmaking account.
The Simple Model
Both models do not take seriously the view that a truthmaker for A is something which by its very existence ensures that A is true. Truthmakers, on this conception, are parts of the actual world. They are not sets of worlds, nor propositions. And the way is open, on this approach, to maintain that he only way a piece of the world can ensure that A_B is true is for it to ensure that A is true or for it to ensure that B is true. And furthermore, we can maintain this thesis, without rejecting the classical account of entailment wholesale, but rather, by enriching our account to pay attention to the ne structure of worlds.
Bigelow and First Degree Entailment
Paying attention to the ne structure of worlds can help us make sense of a passage giving Bigelow's treatment of truthmaking.
Entailment may not be all there is to truthmaking. Not every case of entailment will be a case of truthmaking. But, I claim, every case of truthmaking will be a case of entailment. Perhaps we should formulate truthmaker more delicately, as:`Whenever something is true, there must be something whose existence entails in an appropriate way that it is true.' This leaves much to be desired, but the main point is that unless the existence of a thing does entail a truth, that thing cannot be an adequate or complete truthmaker for that truth. (Bigelow 1988, page 126) Bigelow also examines the problems of making truthmaker work for negative or universal claims, like \there are fewer than n + 1 camels." He proposes revising the truthmaker thesis to say that for any truth A, either for some collection of objects, their existence (appropraitely) entails A, or A (appropriately) entails the existence of some objects which don't actually exist. This is an interesting re nement to deal with those cases without introducing the`totality facts' of Armstrong 1989, but the revision is orthogonal to our present purposes.
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For the moment, we consider propositions to be made up inductively from atomic propositions p1; p2; : : : and their negations, p1; p2; : : :, closing under^and _. We can then de ne (A^B) to be A _ B and (A _B) to be A^ B. This simpli es the treatment of negation in the clauses below.
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I have written elsewhere (Restall 1993 , Restall 1994 of the need to question the assumptions of non-contradiction and bivalence. However, the task here is to show how even those who hold staunchly to classical doctrines can understand relevant entailment, through the models of worlds made up of truthmakers. These models are a simple, understandable generalisation of possible worlds semantics. Instead of taking possible worlds as atomic, we look inside possible worlds to see their ne structure of truthmakers. This gives us access to a more discriminating account of entailment, which can support our pre-theoretic notions of truthmaking. I recommend it to all those who seek to understand contemporary work on relevant logic, 11 and for those who wish to form a robust theory of truthmaking. 12 Given this account, the ternary relational semantics for relevant entailment is simply understood. Our talk of entailment has just considered when an entailment is true, we have not broached the issue of what truthmakers make true what entailments. For this we need more work. And it seems that we will need a ternary relation, because for real conditionals of the form A ) B we need not have the truthmaker for A being identical for the truthmaker for B, and neither of these need be the truthmaker for the conditional A ) B. It is clear that a ternary relation is in the air.
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